Sheila Bair’s book, Bull
by the Horns: Fighting to Save Main Street from Wall Street and Wall Street from
Itself, recounts her view of the financial crisis from her perspective as
chairman of the FDIC during and in the aftermath of the crisis. For those
interested in the bureaucratic political and policy disputes, this book
provides a trove of information. It should not, though, be read in isolation.
There are other books which provide different perspectives, such as former
Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson’s well written book, On the Brink: Inside the Race to Stop the
Collapse of the Global Financial System.
The most notable aspect of the book is the portrayal of former
Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner, which is savage. It is clear that these two do
not like each other. Geithner apparently plans to write his own book. We’ll see
what he has to say about his disagreements with Bair, if anything.
As way of background, I first met Sheila Bair when she was a
commissioner of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”). I was then
an office director in the Domestic Finance section of the Treasury Department. I
was impressed with her knowledge of the details of various issues. She eventually
became the acting chairman of the CFTC. The meetings we had with her at
Treasury on various issues involving the CFTC were always cordial. In
particular, on one occasion, I was impressed with her diplomatic skills when
discussing futures markets with a new high level Treasury political appointee whose
knowledge of the mechanics of futures markets at the time appeared to be
limited.
In the George W. Bush Administration, Sheila Bair was
appointed Treasury Assistant Secretary for Financial Institutions. I did not
report to her but to another Assistant Secretary (Financial Markets). There
were some disagreements between my boss and Bair on issues in which I was
involved (I forget the details), but, as I recall, they were amicably resolved.
While I was at Treasury, I saw a somewhat different side of
her. She could be quite tenacious when she thought she was right. I am consequently not surprised that, when
she was head of the FDIC, others did not view her as a team player. Bair knows
that this is how some people perceive her, and on more than one occasion in her
book, she makes a statement to the effect that she did something in an effort
to be a team player or a good soldier.
Sheila Bair is a bit of an odd duck for a Republican policy
official. She is hardly adverse to financial regulation if she believes it is
necessary and is an advocate for strong consumer protection measures. One Republican
policy official once remarked to me that discussing policy issues with Sheila
Bair was like talking to a liberal Democrat. In fact, on some regulatory
issues, she was more pro regulation than some of her Treasury Department
predecessors in the Clinton Administration. (This now may not be that
surprising to some liberals who make sport of attacking former Secretary of the
Treasury Robert Rubin. Readers of this blog know that I think some of the
criticisms of Rubin are not based on a full knowledge of the complexity of some
issues.)
It was somewhat strange that the George W. Bush nominated
her for two significant policy positions – Treasury Assistant Secretary and
FDIC Chairman. Her replacement at Treasury was Wayne Abernathy, who had
previously worked for Senator Phil Gramm. He was about as anti-regulatory as
one could be and still be confirmable by the Senate. His ideology was
immediately apparent upon entering his office. He had a sign which read: “Who is John Galt?” (For
those who don’t know, this is a reference to Ayn Rand’s Atlas Shrugged.) Given the vast difference between Bair and
Abernathy on regulatory issues, it left me wondering why the Bush Administration
would nominate two such different people. As is sometimes remarked, personnel
choices are policy.
While Sheila Bair obviously is not a good fit with the
dominant factions of today’s Republican party, a hint of why she is a
Republican can be found at the end of the book where she argues that the
current budget deficits are “a source of systemic risk” (p. 353). She provides
little in the way of analysis. She does contend that once there are some
attractive alternatives to Treasury securities, investors will lose their
appetite for Treasuries and interest rates will “skyrocket.” She treats this as self-evident, though the
dangers of the current fiscal situation are highly debatable. There is an
argument that the stimulus was too small and withdrawn too soon, and there are
prominent economists who disagree with her about the dangers of the current
deficits, though some share her concern about the long-term outlook. Be that as
it may, her thinking is in line with current Republican orthodoxy on this issue
and with the opinions of some Democrats.
For a press account of what motivates her, Bair points
readers to a New Yorker article by
Ryan Lizza, “The Contrarian: Sheila Bair and the
White House Financial Debate.” She
writes: “I felt that Lizza ‘got me’…” (p. 306). The article, which I highly
recommend to those curious about Sheila Bair, indicates that she aligns herself
with the “trust-busting” Republican president, Teddy Roosevelt. Left
unmentioned is that there was a schism in the Republican Party after his
presidency, and Roosevelt, along with others, created the Progressive or “Bull
Moose” party. Many former adherents of this party eventually became part of
Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal Democratic coalition.
One of the issues which Sheila Bair discusses but needs to think
about more is the problem of regulatory capture. To be fair, this is an
incredibly difficult issue, and no one really has any good answers. She is,
though, somewhat inconsistent in her discussion of the proper regulatory
structure to deal with this.
On the one hand, she argues that a single financial regulator
for all banks would in effect be just a larger Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (“OCC”) and would be captured in the same way as she contends the OCC
has been. This is the reason she says she opposed Senator Dodd’s proposal for a
single bank regulator during the legislative process that led to the enactment
of the Dodd-Frank legislation.
On the other hand, at the end of the book, Bair proposes
that the OCC be abolished and bank regulation be consolidated in the FDIC and
that bank holding company regulation be the responsibility of the Fed. If this
were to happen, which is unlikely, it would significantly transform the
FDIC. Existing staff of the OCC,
including those current OCC staff that previously worked for the now-defunct
Office of Thrift Supervision, would end up working for the FDIC. The FDIC would
then be the primary federal agency responsible for the supervision of all the
banks in the U.S. including the largest. This would radically change the
agency’s focus on a day-to-day basis. The banks with their lobbyists would then
try to capture the new agency intellectually. It is not clear why Bair is in
favor of this but was against Dodd’s proposal. After all, putting the name FDIC
on what effectively would be a new agency does not by itself guard against regulatory
capture.
Moreover, Bair does not discuss the pros and cons of merging
the current mission of the FDIC of insuring bank deposits and resolving failed
institutions with greatly enhanced supervisory responsibilities. One could
argue, as she does in other places, that the FDIC’s focus on insurance made it
more conservative about banks taking on leverage and risk than the other
regulators, and, without the FDIC at the table, things might have been worse.
There is, in fact, a good case that the current U.S.
financial regulatory structure should be simplified. It is the result of
historical events and not a rational design. On one particular regulatory
structure issue, the nonsensical division of responsibilities for various
derivative markets between the SEC and the CFTC, many agree, as do I, with Bair.
At a minimum, the two agencies should be merged, though this is unlikely any
time soon for political reasons.
As for the banking regulators, along with the regulators for
government-sponsored enterprises, I would argue that there are way too many of
them. Many people agree with Bair that the OCC is too sympathetic to the
concerns of big banks, and, if it can, acts as an advocate for them. That does
not mean, though, that a single regulator would be captured and weak, as Bair
argues in dismissing Senator Dodd’s proposal. In fact, one could make the
opposite argument that competition between the Federal Reserve and the OCC for
banks leads to a certain laxness in regulation. In the case of the OCC, there
is an obvious additional conflict that it relies on fee income for its budget,
not appropriated funds. If it loses a bank to another regulator, it has less
money to spend.
There are, however, other factors at play. The U.K.
consolidated its multiple regulators into the Financial Services Authority
(“FSA”). The performance of the FSA
leading up to the financial crisis was not better than that of U.S. regulators.
Many observers did not see this, though. In fact, prior to the financial crisis
hitting in full force, Secretary Paulson was trying to import its
“light-touch,” “principles-based” regulation to the U.S., because he felt that
stricter regulation was hurting New York in favor of London. Once the financial
crisis hit, that idea of course had to be dropped.
Both the U.S. fractionated financial regulatory structure and
the U.K.’s unified regulator failed in the years leading up to the financial
crisis. The David Cameron government has been restructuring financial
regulation in the U.K., and the FSA is in the process of being abolished.
In the U.S., unfortunately, barring another financial
crisis, nothing is likely to happen legislatively anytime soon to restructure
the U.S. regulatory system. Dodd-Frank was a missed opportunity. The financial regulators
will have to work together to make the current unwieldy system work.
More thought needs to be given to the problem of regulatory
capture. Regulatory capture not only involves the implicit promise of jobs in
the private sector; it can also be intellectual and social. Regulators by
necessity have to rely on information about business and market practices and
developments from the institutions they regulate but have to be discerning
enough to know when information is provided in a self-serving and selective
fashion. This is not easy. There are outside groups who do research on
regulatory issues and lobby on them from a pro-regulatory perspective. While I
am sympathetic with the motivations of such groups, their knowledge about the
details of the financial industry is of course inferior to that of the
participants, and it is also sometimes presented in a selective and biased way.
As for Sheila Bair, she obviously was a very capable leader
of the FDIC and led it through an incredibly difficult and challenging period. She
has been a dedicated public servant, and we are all the better for it. Her main
criticism of Tim Geithner is that he was too inclined to favor large financial
institutions is not unique to her, and it is a legitimate point. Her ideas on
forcing the restructuring the largest financial institutions into a manageable
number of distinct subsidiaries should be considered by current government
officials, senior bank officials, and others.
Now that she is out of government, perhaps she will have the
time to give more thought to regulatory structure and ways to mitigate the
problem of regulatory capture. After
all, the regulatory failure that contributed to the financial crisis was not
primarily the result of a lack of regulatory authority but the failure of
regulatory agencies – and with respect to mortgage lending practices, the
refusal of the Federal Reserve – to use existing authority. In the case of derivatives,
while Bair contends that the regulatory problem was that the Commodity Futures
Modernization Act of 2000 prohibited the CFTC and the SEC to regulate over the
counter contracts such as credit default swaps (“CDS”), the financial
regulatory agencies did have authority over many of the financial institutions
who made markets in these instruments and could have taken action. For example, does anyone think that some of
the activities of financial institutions with respect to CDS and synthetic
collateralized debt obligations were safe and sound banking practices? And why did the banking regulators not notice
the buildup of risk at AIG, since it was in effect acting as an insurance
company for commercial and investment banks they regulated or supervised?
Bull by the Horns is
worth reading for those interested in financial regulatory issues. It gives the
perspective of one major participant in developing the government’s response to
the financial crisis. While there are somewhat more passages that are sharply
critical of her colleagues than I would have expected, I should warn though
that this does not make the book a page-turner. The book does not assume that
readers have a lot of knowledge about the subjects covered, but it will
probably be primarily of interest mainly to those who have studied and thought
about these issues.