Yesterday,
I saw “The Big Short,” a movie based on the book by Michael Lewis. It was
announced today that it one of eight films nominated for the “Best Picture”
Oscar award. It is an entertaining movie, but I doubt that it will have much,
if any, impact on the regulation of financial markets or financial
institutions.
The
movie focuses, as does the book, on a few, rather strange persons
(fictionalized in the movie) who saw that there was a housing bubble of major
proportions and that, when it burst, many of the mortgages which had been
packaged into mortgage-backed securities and subsequently into collateralized debt
obligations (“CDOs”) would end up in foreclosure. They decided to short the
market in a big way and were ultimately rewarded.
For
those who have not heard of CDOs and credit default swaps, the movie, while
both entertaining and in places comedic, is a painless introduction of some of
the practices that led to the 2008 financial market meltdown. It is, though, by
necessity incomplete and a bit misleading.
In
particular, the description of synthetic CDOs, which features Richard Thaler,
an economist playing himself, and actress Selena Gomez in a Las Vegas casino is
incomplete. Rather than trying to explain that synthetic CDOs were created by
putting in them credit default swaps referencing mortgage-backed securities, instead
of the securities themselves, the movie’s explanation of this describes the
betting that this structure facilitates.
The
reason that this is important is that it was the presence of short sellers that
enabled the creation of the credit default swaps that were put into the CDOs.
How much this exacerbated the financial crisis has been debated. “Yves Smith”
of the blog “Naked Capitalism” is rather
caustic on this point.
While
the real life characters on whom the movie is based were not that big nor that
significant compared to someone like John Paulson, who was also shorting the
market, in one instance controversially involved with Goldman Sachs in creating
a
very bad synthetic CDO (“Abacus”), they were more opportunistic in seeing
the trade of a lifetime than heroes. To be fair, the movie does not portray
them as unalloyed heroes, but it is clear for whom the audience should be
rooting.
Also,
while the bailout of the major financial institutions is implicitly criticized,
it is left unmentioned that the short sellers benefitted from the bailout, in
particular that of AIG, which ended up holding much of the risk that other
financial institutions wanted to unload through the use of credit default
swaps. If the government had not undertaken through TARP and other measures to
bail out the Street, the counterparties to the shorts might not have been able
to come up with the money they owed the shorts.
This
is all perhaps more complicated than an entertainment movie could put into a
story, but it is worth reminding ourselves of what happened. The Street needed
the shorts to create the synthetic CDOs. The synthetic CDOs were easier to
construct than CDOs with actual mortgage-backed securities, and, moreover, even
with the flurry of mortgage lending there was not enough mortgages to meet the
demand for CDOs.
The
movie implies that it was mainly a few people with somewhat inadequate social
skills who saw that there was a housing bubble. Plenty of people saw it; it was
just as obvious as the tech stock bubble that preceded it. The failure of the
Federal Reserve, and in particular Chairman Greenspan, to see that there was a
bubble and to use the Fed’s existing authority to rein in the abusive lending
practices in subprime mortgages was a gigantic mistake. There is, though,
plenty of blame to pass around. (The
Onion had a funny article in July 2008 headlined “Recession-Plagued
Nation Demands New Bubble to Invest In.”)
What
many did not see, though, was the major financial calamity that would result
when the bubble burst. After all, the end of the tech stock bubble, while
unpleasant, was manageable. The bursting of the housing bubble and the
subsequent financial crisis is still affecting us eight years later.
The
shorts were right in realizing that the bursting of the bubble would be
calamitous. But they were also lucky. While bubbles of the magnitude of what
happened in housing and tech stocks are not hard to see, it is near impossible to
predict when the supply of “greater fools” will run out and the whole thing
collapses. The movie gets at this by depicting the losses and withdrawals one hedge
fund manager had to endure while he waited for the massive defaults he knew were
coming. If he had been a bit more off on his timing, he may not have had the
financial wherewithal to keep his positions until they paid off.
At
the end, the movie criticizes the failure to break up the big banks and the
failure to prosecute the fraud that took place. This may make some moviegoers
angry, as it should, but I doubt that this movie will change the political
realities.
Nevertheless,
the movie is worth seeing. The acting is first rate, it captures the characters
and the atmosphere of the mortgage frenzy, and, in places, the movie is quite
funny. Also, while the explanations of some of the financial instruments are
incomplete, it serves to bring some more clarity in an entertaining fashion to
those not familiar with the arcana of the Street about what happened.